Bujar Bukoshi, former prime minister of the government of Kosovo in exile and then an active participant in political life, being a minister and deputy prime minister in post-war Kosovo, has been away from the political scene for years. Mr. Bukoshi, after the insistence of the Tema newspaper, talks about the perspective of Kosovo in relation to international developments, the confrontation of the former political leaders of the KLA with the Special Court and the importance of preserving the state identity of Kosovo.
The publisher of the newspaper Tema Mero Baze spoke with Mr. Bukoshi
Mr. Bukoshi, the government of Kosovo is facing increasing pressure from the international community to reach a final agreement with Serbia. The hesitations are clear, as are the warnings of the international community. Would you like to be in Albin Kurti's position at this moment?
I don't know if I would like to be in his position, since I haven't had any emotion from political positions for a long time, but I can say that when we started this job, we were on the other side of the barricade. It was us who begged the international community to open its doors to us, to welcome us, to listen to us so that we could explain to them what was the work of Kosovo and what was our project and vision.
In the late 80s, Kosovo was a nuisance for international diplomacy. She was even too lazy to listen to us. In the 90s, when we tried to impose ourselves with our political self-organization, we were faced with a wall of indifference, which was sad and broke due to our resistance and of course because of Serbia's bloody crimes in the Balkans. Even today, that sadness for our helplessness at that time suppresses me, but it also makes me proud that we faced those challenges.
Now it is easy to act as if we have the fate of the USA or the European Union in our hands in the Balkans. But it is serious and wrong that it is not forgiven to do this to a country which is alive thanks to the West. In this aspect, having said this, I think that the Prime Minister of Kosovo should respect Kosovo's past, the history of its state formation and not act as if Kosovo is a state that was founded not even two full years ago when he came to power. History does not start over every time someone becomes prime minister in this country. I know that there have been similar phenomena before, but to claim today that this is the best government in the Balkans is to dream in the sun, or to commit Munchausen...
Are you aware of the latest deal offer from the German side that is supported by the US?
No, I am not aware, but I can guess that it is one of those efforts of the international community to create a climate of trust in the signing of a final agreement. What the government of Kosovo should do is to strip itself of populist demagoguery and be transparent with the public by saying what is in favor and what is not in favor of Kosovo at this moment, so as they say "where is the cry and where is the loss" ... Those who are currently in charge of affairs should not behave like people who were born only to win. They should behave like people who are fighting and when you fight you can suffer something. You may lose a battle, but you don't lose the war.
Look at Serbia from the other side. It has quite the opposite behavior. He screams and shouts as if you beat the dog, in the "ooo, we're done" style, because they are supposedly destroying him with the deal offered, but in fact, things are not that bad from that deal. But in the final he manages the reaction and adapts to the agreement.
An elderly villager of mine, without any college, not even a master's degree, told me: my son, don't trust the rumors that even when he finally enters and destroys the house, he screams and calls "help me, the owner drowned me". Our politicians and rulers behave as if they were born to win not only over Serbia, but also over the European Union and the United States of America. I made my answer a little long...
How does the fact that Kurti has an empty field from his strong opponents who are in The Hague affect this situation?
Kurti does not have the battle with the Albanians. It is with Serbia and the Herculean task of convincing the international community. The Albanians have given him a mandate to complete this work. He cannot abuse the fact that he has no strong opponents. His biggest enemy now is the former Albin Kurti himself before the victory. The one who did not know the Republic, independence, and international agreements of Kosovo. Now this Prime Minister Albin Kurti must first "kill" the opposition Albin Kurti and then think about how to defeat the other opponents. And it's not so easy to kill yourself. And she wants some manhood.
Do you believe that the establishment of the Special Court and the summoning to The Hague for two years of the main leaders of the KLA was politically calculated to create this situation?
I don't think that justice comes from political schemes. I don't want to think about that at all. Even more so a justice for which the West has invested hundreds of millions of euros from its taxpayers.
But, I think that the banality of this situation with the Kosovo Albanian leaders being held in The Hague is probably even worse. They have been held in prison for two years, without charges being filed yet. They could be free in Kosovo while none of the leaders of Kosovo have escaped justice. Kosovo is the only country in the Balkans that has no leader who has hidden from international and local justice, as Croatia, Bosnia and especially Serbia have had. And in this respect, they could freely await the filing of the indictment in court.
The arrest two years ago and detention in The Hague looks like an ugly mix of Western bureaucracy, the political appetites of those who set up a court based on a bogus and idiotic report like Dick Marty's and further backstabbing (that someone he once mentioned them with pleasure) from the politics of Kosovo. It is clear that the political and especially the diplomatic garrison of Kosovo these days has spoken in their ears what the leaders of the special court wanted to hear, presenting Hashim Thaçi and others as dangerous people to remain free in Kosovo.
What is wrong with the Special Court in this case?
I am not against the Special Court. In a way, we took the work to the Special Court ourselves, with the lack of efficient justice in Kosovo. But in this case, the Special Court is behaving as if the special forces that kidnap four people put them in prison and then ask what they have done. There is irrational behavior at this point that appears to be caused by many local and international factors. I do not agree that they should be kept in jail without a clear charge.
Do you know what charges will be brought against them?
No. I have no contact with them. And it's not like I have any friendship with them. But the fact that they judge them as a political dome of the KLA in an attempt to call the KLA a criminal group (joint criminal enterprise) is a wrong and dangerous approach that has nothing to do with the truth or history. The KLA was not a criminal group and they were not really the all-powerful controllers or leaders of the KLA. THE LIBERATION ARMY OF KOSOVO was a reaction of the Albanians to the prolongation of the peaceful resolution of the crisis to end the regime of Nazi Serbia in Kosovo.
Neither Hashim Thaçi nor those in The Hague created the KLA. They tried to organize him and give him a political shield. But KLA was born spontaneously in every village of Kosovo that was burning, in every house where a crime happened and in every city that had a confrontation with violence. Even we, as the government of Kosovo, tried to control the KLA and bring it under our political shield, without tricks, but we could not succeed. It was not our idea and could not be under our control. It was a popular reaction.
Hashim Thaçi and his associates succeeded more efficiently in being its popular people, but not people who could control everything there. It was essentially a decentralized organization that had its own idols but no single commander.
It is said that there are direct accusations of political eliminations against them. Are you aware?
I am not aware of any specific charges. The truth is that there have been tensions and clashes up to murder in the first years after liberation, but this is a consequence of our political culture, deficiencies in mutual tolerance and the standard of a society which has many dark spots within it. Fortunately, many of those incidents have been investigated and those responsible are known. This is a matter that belongs to the courts of Kosovo based on the facts they have. They are in The Hague more with the testimony of the Serbian policemen than of the Albanians.
After all, I beg of you, where are those famous trafficked organs, with the primordial charge with which Kosovo is imprisoned in The Hague? Can someone answer me as I also dealt with kidney transplants at the Steglitz Clinic in Berlin in 1984?
Where are those transplantologists in the yellow house, where the bear carries the mail?
The Albanian state (belatedly) is raising this question and it is doing well.
Since the problems you had with the leaders of the KLA during the war and contradictions with them are mentioned, how do you remember the creation of the KLA and the confrontations with it, even from the political side.
We must agree on what the KLA was publicly called and what the KLA was. Politically, the KLA was a group of about 100 members that was led by the People's Movement of Kosovo and that appeared during the funeral of a Kosovo Albanian teacher. They were a small political nucleus and you cannot call them an army. You can call it a unit, you can call it a cell or a political party, but not an army. KLA was formed out of Serbian violence and as a reaction to attempts to annihilate Albanians. This group naturally benefited from its "license" but never had control over it.
I myself immediately expressed my solidarity with the KLA. I thought that in those circumstances self-defense and insurrection were necessary. I thought we should continue our political struggle, but with an armed wing. So it would be politics with bullets.
Did you have meetings with KLA leaders at that time?
I had a meeting with members of the General Staff of the KLA in Tirana in 1998. I met with Hashim Thaçi and his associates. My main point in the meeting was as follows: the conflict has erupted; I respect the people who fight on the ground; now we must unite politically and militarily. I told them that now we must pool all resources for the common goal. So I offered him government money, professional officers and institutional support. We should have a common supreme headquarters and all the funds we had accumulated over the years could be put to their service for the armed struggle.
At that time, the KLA had very brave village commanders who were ready to sacrifice their lives for the war.
How did the events unfold after the failure of the Agreement?
We decided to create a security force under the control of Kosovo's institutions, but we decided to merge with them on the ground. So we ordered our forces to enter Kosovo with KLA emblems, thus proving not only the agreement that the KLA was a people's army created from below, but also the fact that it was not controlled by any strict authority. I knew that professional military officers were welcomed by village commanders. It was the KLA General Staff that had reserves.
I ordered the Ministry of Defense to coordinate with the KLA General Staff to send 30-40 professional military officers to enter Kosovo and join the KLA as soon as possible. Military officers were placed at the disposal of village commanders. It was important that the professional military officers were not seen as taking over from the village commanders who had started the armed struggle. We set a budget in the Ministry of Defense and Minister Ahmet Krasniqi gave funds to the General Staff of the KLA.
If the Special Court succeeds in indicting Hashim Thaçi and other political leaders, as authorities who are responsible for KLA crimes, how close are they to reality?
Hashim Thaçi may have been a man of authority, or of popularity as they say in Albanian, but he did not have the real authority and power to command everything that happened within what was called the KLA. It was a war of the Albanians against the armed formations of Serbia.
Hashim Thaçi and I were politicians who fought to bring this war under political control. But neither he, nor I, nor Ibrahim Rugova, nor anyone else had the proper authority and power to control what happened. It is one thing to be popular for being at the head of a political movement and another to be able to have the authority to control that movement. Hashim Thaçi does not have it. Neither do the others. I don't have it in the institutional wing either.
We have seen several high level politicians visiting The Hague. It is almost back to the pilgrimage. Your comment?
I know, I've seen them. It is human for someone who misses Hashim Thaçi or others to go see him. But when the visits are made as a political gesture, I think that it does not help those who are there much.
I understand why this happens. It is also a kind of reaction to the often evil attitude that Kosovo institutions or political officials secretly maintain towards them, presenting them as dangerous people in Kosovo. This has naturally politicized the situation and now we are in front of this spectacle.
They need to be helped by the state of Kosovo with facts that refute the accusations and by Kosovo's diplomacy on the right track. From Albania's diplomacy as well.
Finally, do you have a comment about the recent tension over license plates that Kurti's government seems determined not to issue, even though the West is asking me to postpone that deadline?
They asked me some friends, does Kurti refuse the postponement of the license plate deadline? I was told "he pushes and sings too", according to a well-known anecdote in Kosovo.
The deceased Rugova often told me: connect with the strong one and listen, otherwise you won't cut it...
If what I'm telling you may seem nonsense or folklore, I can tell you the following point: Preservation of Kosovo's state identity is very important. But it is not a battle that is won in a day. Of greater importance than this is the preservation of the alliance with the West, with the USA and the European Union, which are long-term guarantors of Kosovo's state identity. That is the great battle. These small battles may make you popular among your militants but they leave no mark on the history of the state. Great politicians are the ones who are good at making hard deals. Not to make a deal is the easiest thing. But that doesn't make you a winner. This in many cases looks more like desertion.