World War II: Preparation of the German invasion of Albania

2023-01-23 18:14:28Histori SHKRUAR NGA MARENGLEN KASMI
Illustrative photo

The year 1943 was the year of major strategic changes for both warring parties during the Second World War, both for the Nazi-fascist bloc and for the Anglo-American-Soviet allies. In this context, the front of Southeast Europe gained a special importance. Albania, as a result of its geographical position, long coastline but also a number of military airfields in good condition, constituted a key strategic and operational node for both sides. While the Allies, mainly the British, were thinking about the opening of the Second Front in Europe, where for all the above-mentioned reasons Albania was the most suitable place for landing, the Germans, aware of this,

The document that we are publishing today for the first time sheds light on the precautions taken by the German high authorities for the invasion of Albania.

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The situation in the Albanian lands is best illustrated by a report of the German ambassador in Sofia, Adolf Beckerle (1902-1976), who on February 10, 1943 reported to Berlin as follows:The Consul General of Skopje gave me a report a few days ago [...] and described the situation in the Albanian space in the blackest way possible. Hatred of Italians has reached its peak. The Albanians are united and determined in this enmity [against the Italians – MK]. Life there is like on a volcano and very soon it is expected that the Albanians will rise in a general uprising. The uncertainty is fueled by the defeatist state of the Italians, who seem very scared and try to calm down the Albanians through concessions. The attitude of the Albanians towards us, the Germans, continues to be friendly. They hope that with our help they will win an independent and free Albania. This applies both to the Albanians living in the Bulgarian territories in Macedonia, as well as to the Albanians in present-day Albania".

World War II: Preparation of the German invasion of Albania

The same attitude and assessment towards this issue was also held by the high German military hierarchy. They even shared this concern with Rome. So, the German Commander-in-Chief in Serbia reported that the situation in Albania was not stabilized, which created very good conditions for the Allies to land in Southern Albania. So, to forestall any surprises, it was decided that two German divisions would continue to stand in readiness in Serbia, although they were meant to be used on another war front.

Regarding the measures that the German Wehrmacht had to take in Albania to prevent the situation, details are given in an encrypted telegram from the German consul in Tirana Schliep, addressed to the German embassy in Rome on February 24, 1943. He writes: "On 21.2 and 22.2 captain Dr. appeared before me. Gustav Stratil/Sauer, who was identified via a valid Wehrmacht High Command ID card. He told me that he was tasked by the intelligence office in Sofia to assess and report on the situation in Albania, and especially on the hotbed of unrest in South Albania. Based on the opinion generated, Sauer will advise his superiors as follows:

1. The establishment of an information network with trusted people in South Albania to collect continuous information about the strength, weaponry, activities and political stance of the fighters.

2. Facilitating a meeting with gang leaders.

3. Placement in advance of at least one German battalion in Korça.

4. Creation of an Albanian legion, with the Albanian minorities in Bulgaria and Serbia, perhaps for immediate use in case of any possible landing attempt in Southern Albania.

5. Setting up a liaison station at the General Consulate [Tirana – MK] with equipment and personnel.

For point 1, the General Consulate should start working now [...]".

Following the course of events in Albania before the invasion in September 1943, but also the occupation policies after the entry of the German Wehrmacht in Albania, we come to the conclusion that the proposals of Captain Dr. Sauer were taken into consideration by his superiors. As noted in the document, the German legation in Tirana immediately began organizing a network of trusted people, not only in South Albania, as Sauer proposed, but throughout Albania, including Kosovo. This contingent was formed mainly by Albanians educated in Austria and Germany, who at that time were also supporters of "deutsche Kultur" (German culture) in Albania. Such were Xhaferr Deva, Rexhep Mitrovica, etc. in Kosovo, or Vehbi Frashëri in Albania, etc.

Also, the attempts to get close to the leaders of the gangs, as the Germans called both the partisan and nationalist formations, was quite vital for German politics. Taking into consideration the fact that the greatest danger to Germany came from the Allies, the German leaders, learning from the failures of the Italians in Albania, sought the cooperation of all non-governmental fighting formations, in order to achieve a political and military peace in Albania , to concentrate only on the defense of the coastline, should an Allied landing occur on the south-eastern front. Historical experience showed that the Albanian political-military formations did not react in the same way to this policy. While the National Liberation Front led by the Communist Party did not accept this cooperation policy, exponents with a nationalist voice, who then gathered under the roof of the Albanian government, but also others who were involved in the organization of the National Front and dictated the policy of this organization, accepted this offer from the Germans. This was clearly shown in the agreement that was born "dead" in Mukje, where the National Front went and gave guarantees in advance to the Germans that it would not fight against them.

As for the proposal to place a German battalion in Korça, Captain Sauer's proposal was exceeded, because before the German occupation of Albania, the German Wehrmacht deployed more forces in Albania, mainly for the protection of military airfields.

The last proposal, for raising a legion from the Albanian minorities of Bulgaria and Serbia, was not accepted by the German leaders. They thought that their use in Southern Albania would cause great dissatisfaction among the Albanian population and would be considered as an intervention of Bulgaria in the internal affairs of Albania.

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Despite the lack of long-term National Socialist plans for Albania and the forced invasion of Albania for legitimate military reasons in September 1943, the invasion of Albania was not carried out without taking preparatory measures. The above document, but also a number of other German documents prove this. This documentation fills a historical void of this period because, among other things, it gives us details about the attitude of the Albanian political forces towards the invaders. From time to time it is articulated today by selected researchers that the Germans were transients in Albania and we are not dealing with a classic invasion of a country. The course of events and archival documents prove otherwise.

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