There is no doubt.
The Bank of Albania said what it had to say, even though not everyone chose to listen. When this institution talks about a “new reality,” it is not referring to temporary price fluctuations or some transitory shock from abroad. It is describing a change. Even when it almost silently increased its gold reserves, it sent us a clear signal confirming that this change is not expected to be short-term. Central banks do not change their reserves because of a “bad” month. They make these moves when they foresee that the environment ahead is changing and instability is on the horizon. The problem is not whether the Bank of Albania understands this situation or not. The problem is the rest of the system, which continues to behave as if it does not understand. The costs of the gap between understanding and acting will not be paid by institutions, but by citizens.
For a long time, the public narrative offered has reduced the importance of the situation to a familiar pattern: prices rise, then fall. Fuel prices rise, then stabilize. Inflation rises, then normalizes. This logic no longer holds. What we are seeing is not a cycle. It is a change in conditions. Albania is not able to control the forces that drive this change. It simply imports them. Fuel prices, transportation costs and a significant part of food inputs are determined outside our borders. When these prices change, the Albanian economy cannot absorb the shock. It immediately transmits it and sometimes completely. This is a structural weakness, a direction where it should have been continuously investing. This is why the Bank of Albania is preparing for a more uncertain phase, because what is expected is not a one-time increase. It is a repetition. It is instability that is returning and returning, not instability that disappears. And this is a fact.
Yet, while some parts of the state are preparing, others are continuing to improvise. There does not yet seem to be a strategy on the horizon for how to manage how external pressures can translate into domestic prices. When fuel prices rise, the system reacts but does not anticipate. It comments but does not structure a response. It waits for the pressure to increase and then responds. The reaction is as if the objective were to calm the situation momentarily rather than to manage the risk before it arises.
In the situation we are facing, this approach is no longer sufficient.
The way fuel prices are set in Albania is not neutral. It is set by a layered tax structure where turnover taxes, carbon components and excise duties are further added by VAT. This means that price increases in international markets are amplified domestically before reaching the gas pump. So, we are in conditions where there is no automated mechanism to mitigate the effect of shocks coming from abroad. There is no adjustment of the fiscal burden, no suspension of taxation (only reduction), no transparent explanation of the extent to which the final price reflects the cost and the extent to which it reflects the structure. At the same time, the market itself operates without the level of scrutiny that such a context requires. In concentrated sectors like this one, where competition is a foreign word, prices tend to rise quickly and fall slowly. This is a fact. But there is still no consistent, real-time system in place to show us import costs, no systematic publication of margins, and no visible pressure on operators to justify price movements during volatile periods. And in the absence of transparency, trust erodes. And when trust erodes, perception turns into reality.
On the other hand, citizens are left free to interpret everything for themselves.
If we talk about consumer product prices, there is no coordinated communication about them either, explaining what is happening, what might happen next, and what this means for Albanian businesses and families. To date, there has been no effort to prepare citizens for a scenario where prices may not stabilize as “quickly” as before or where credit may remain expensive for longer than expected. In such an environment, silence is not impartiality. It becomes a risk factor.
The result of this combination is predictable and activates a chain effect.
Households begin to adapt quietly (no one protests in this country). They spend less. They delay decisions. They absorb costs where they can and reduce them where they need to. Businesses follow a similar logic, gradually raising prices, protecting margins where they can, and delaying investments where uncertainty is highest. Credit will remain tight, not out of panic, but out of caution. In this way, pressure gradually builds up throughout the system. And that is where economic strain is created. Not through collapse, but through compression.
However, it is important to be clear about something.
The Bank of Albania is doing its job. It is signaling the risk, adjusting its position and preparing for a more complex environment, where volatility is the key word. But on the other hand, monetary policy cannot manage this situation alone. It cannot reduce the structural impact of fuel prices, it cannot enforce market transparency and it cannot protect Albanian households from the direct effects of shocks coming from outside.
This is someone else's responsibility. It is the responsibility of the government and the executive structures. And for now this responsibility is not being exercised in proportion to the level of urgency that the situation requires. If the situation continues to be treated in the same way, there will no longer be a sudden crisis that requires immediate intervention. It will be something 'silent' and more dangerous. Prices will continue to increase unevenly, but also continuously. Wages will have difficulty keeping up with the pace of prices. Credit will remain limited and restrictive. Businesses will operate in constant uncertainty. And Albanian families will have to cope with the adjustment, month after month, without any structured protection.
This is not a hypothetical scenario. It has already begun.
Because the question no longer stands whether we are entering a new reality, because this has already been established.
The real question is whether we are willing to act on the understanding and acceptance of this new reality. Because if an institution like the Bank of Albania is already preparing for unstable times, while the rest of the system continues to behave as if stability is guaranteed, then the outcome is not difficult to predict.
It's not a crisis.
It is erosion.
And if erosion starts to become apparent, it is always more costly to rehabilitate than to prevent it.