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"The myth of Israeli security has collapsed, support for Hamas will increase in the West Bank"

2023-10-21 17:01:23Kosova&Bota SHKRUAR NGA REDAKSIA VOX
"The myth of Israeli security has collapsed, support for Hamas will
The myth of Israeli security has collapsed, support for Hamas will increase in the West Bank

Tareq Baconi is the chairman of the board of directors of the Al-Shabaka think-tank group, the Palestine Policy Network.

He worked with the International Crisis Group in Ramallah and is the author of the 2018 book Controlling Hamas, a text in which, drawing on interviews with the organization's leaders as well as the group's publications, he traces the thirty-year transition of Hamas from marginal military resistance to a group that, in Baconi's words, "has used two elements that characterize its history—strategy and patience—to transform itself into a sophisticated movement to the point of carrying out an attack like the one on October 7".

Tareq Baconi's interview for " La Stampa ":

Did you expect Hamas to go to such savagery?

"No, I didn't expect it. I don't even think Hamas imagined it would go this far. In some ways, the belief that Israel has an invincible army, that it has equally valuable intelligence, persists, and the idea that the blockade of the Gaza Strip was truly impenetrable. The fact that Hamas was able to do what it did, how it did it, and sustain an operation in Israeli towns and villages for hours, has a major effect on the security statements Israel has been making for years. And I don't think Hamas anticipated the fact that Israeli artillery and weapons would allow this. I'm not saying they didn't believe they could get behind the fences, but I think they themselves were surprised by the scale of the attack, how long it lasted, and how weak the Israeli defense system was. I believe that Hamas wanted to carry out an attack to activate a liberation strategy, but I think it did not foresee a start like this, which weakened the basic Israeli pillar, the myth of security."

What was and what is the strategic and political objective of Hamas today?

"That policy was very clear from the beginning: they want to reject the idea that Israel can continue with impunity with forms of colonizing violence against the Palestinians. It opposes the idea that Israel can continue to enjoy the relations it has with Europe, the United States, and increasingly the Arab world, under the pretense of being a democratic Jewish state. And then they wanted to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the agenda, to overturn the assumption that the Palestinians could live indefinitely with what was happening. How they handle the coming weeks will depend on how much support they are able to mobilize outside the Beltway. Not in terms of support for Hamas, but in terms of protests. Hezbollah in the north can support in the West Bank. But these are still ongoing considerations."

Do you think Hamas will be defeated in the military operation in Gaza if Hezbollah and other entities are not involved in the conflict?

"Yes, I think Israel is working with the goal of defeating Hamas. But I think it won't be possible. The Hamas organization can be destroyed, of course, by isolating Hamas, almost to the point of ethnic cleansing. But Hamas is much more than an organization, it is an ideology. And even if Hamas is destroyed at the organizational level, there will be another uprising, a kind of Palestinian mobilization for liberation, as happens in anti-colonial struggles. The reality is that Israel doesn't have a problem - Hamas, it has a Palestinian problem. To destroy Hamas, it must destroy Gaza, but if the uprising were to move to the West Bank, to Lebanon, Israel would be in a much more difficult position and it is not certain that it would emerge victorious."

How do you imagine the future of the Gaza Strip?

"It is useful to remember that the Strip represented a challenge to Israel long before Hamas controlled it. Since 1948, Israeli authorities have been trying to encircle the Gaza Strip, but for years Hamas has been the perfect excuse to maintain the blockade. The challenge that Gaza represents is that two-thirds of the population are refugees seeking to return home to what is now Israel, and under international law they have the right to do so. What we are seeing, the preparation of the ground offensive by Israel, is not only a revenge for what happened on October 7, but it is also a demographic engineering plan, they are using this moment to remove the population of Gaza from the Strip to create a refugee problem in Egypt".

Let's return to the West Bank, where Palestinians feel less and less represented by Abu Mazen.

“Autoriteti Palestinez nuk perceptohet më si një organ legjitim, ai shihet si një zgjatim i Izraelit për shkak të koordinimit të sigurisë. Në vitin 2021, sondazhet treguan se nëse do të kishte pasur zgjedhje, Hamasi do të kishte fituar sërish, por shumica e palestinezëve nuk do të votonin për Hamasin në mbështetje të ideologjisë së tij islamike, por sepse përfaqëson luftën e rezistencës ushtarake. Palestinezët e shohin Hamasin si një parti që i mbron ata nga agresioni izraelit. Pas një sulmi të këtij lloji, pas asaj që po ndodh në Rrip, ka shumë të ngjarë që mbështetja e Hamasit të rritet në Bregun Perëndimor”.

Kohët e fundit keni thënë se Hamasi po përpiqet “të kthejë tavolinat mbi izraelitët”, duke argumentuar se ata nuk mund ta harrojnë çështjen palestineze dhe se mund të vënë në pikëpyetje mitin e pathyeshmërisë. Çështja e harruar palestineze ka qenë dhe është në qendër të protestave që janë përhapur në pjesën më të madhe të botës arabe ditët e fundit. Cili është kuptimi i këtyre shesheve?

“Protestat janë shumë të rëndësishme sepse bien ndesh me idenë se çështja palestineze nuk është më një çështje qendrore për regjimet dhe qeveritë arabe. Jo vetëm kaq, njerëzit në këto protesta tregojnë se kjo deklaratë është e rrezikshme. Deri dy javë më parë, kjo situatë përdorej për të mbështetur marrëveshjet e normalizimit midis Izraelit dhe botës arabe. Analiza fillestare ishte se çështja palestineze nuk do të shfaqej si një faktor i aftë për të mobilizuar masat. Por protestat tregojnë se ekziston një dallim i madh midis asaj që mendojnë regjimet dhe asaj që mendojnë njerëzit në rrugë, dhe vazhdojnë të konfirmojnë rëndësinë qendrore të kauzës palestineze në botën e tyre”.

Çfarë evolucioni imagjinoni për mospajtimin e shfaqur nga këto sheshe të animuar nga zhgënjimi për mospërfaqësimin?

“Është shumë herët për të thënë, por është e qartë se ata kanë potencialin për të krijuar shumë presion. Historikisht, kauza palestineze ka qenë gjithmonë ajo në të cilën udhëheqësit arabë janë fokusuar për të larguar vëmendjen nga çështjet e brendshme. Njerëzit në këto vende toleruan regjimet shtypëse sepse mendonin se këta liderë po vepronin në mbështetje të Palestinës. Skenari ka ndryshuar në dekadat e fundit: këta liderë mendonin se fuqia e tyre, veçanërisht pas revolucioneve të 2011, mund të shtohej nga një aleancë sigurie, ushtarake dhe diplomatike me Izraelin. Tani, në një kontekst ku masat arabe po shfaqen në mbështetje të Palestinës, kjo mund të përkthehet në kundërshtim me vetë regjimet, kështu që unë mendoj se regjimet janë shumë, shumë të shqetësuar”.

A mendoni se kjo mund të ndryshojë qasjen e regjimeve arabe ndaj Izraelit?

"It depends a lot on what happens in the coming days and weeks. In countries like Jordan or Egypt, which have a longer history of peace, of 'cold peace', people do not approve of peace agreements. There is already a lot of pressure in Jordan to expel the ambassador and undermine diplomatic agreements, and this is an issue that has already existed in recent years whenever the slightest escalation has occurred. In countries where the agreements are more recent, such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, I think that the approach to the population will remain quite authoritarian and I believe that the regimes will try to suppress any kind of protest in support of the Palestinians. I think they try to ride the wave and keep the deals. The same for Morocco. An even different story for Saudi Arabia, which was moving toward a deal about which great skepticism remained. I think now it will be much more difficult for Saudi Arabia to reach the terms of an agreement."

What will be the political price for Netanyahu?

"Netanyahu always comes back, but at the same time it was the biggest failure of an Israeli leader in history. October 7 represents the greatest loss of Jewish life since 1948 and the strategic and security failure is unprecedented. I don't know how Netanyahu can survive this, politically. It is the entire Israeli political structure that has stalled, a structure that is based on the idea that the security infrastructure, the militarization of society, the political reality of the occupation guaranteed the safety of Israeli Jews. There is no going back to that illusion now. There is no way that any Israeli Jew can truly believe that he is safe until the Palestinian issue is resolved. It's too early to say how this will shape the Israeli political and social fabric, but I really think it will change the minds of Israelis and the idea of ​​being a safe haven forever."


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