Analysis of the former head of secret operations of the CIA: Is the US thinking of killing Putin?

From Douglas London, Foreign Policy

When Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in May this year after his helicopter crashed in a mountainous area in the northeast of the country on his way back from Azerbaijan, the first question I saw raised in the media was whether the United States had a hand in the incident. United.

Even during the recent trip of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang, North Korea, there was talk of the good possibility of his elimination while he was away from the Kremlin. But should the US and its allies aim to topple Putin, enabling a coup when he is not in Russia, or kill him during such trips abroad?

The answer depends on the assessment of risk versus reward. What would be gained by killing Putin? Would Russia's threat to the United States and its allies escalate? Would Russian troops withdraw from Ukraine, and no longer be a threat to NATO allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe? Or could the Russians' intentions become even more hostile and less predictable?

Despite Putin's obsession with intrigue, denial and deception, he remains very predictable. In fact, the United States, along with Britain, were the only ones among NATO allies, not to mention Ukraine itself, to correctly predict Putin's plans to attack Kiev.

Will the United States intervene in this way? Historical records show America supported the overthrow of democratically elected regimes in Iran in 1953 and Chile in 1973, while a congressional investigative committee documented dozens of CIA attempts to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro. .

More recently, the US made no effort to hide its authorship of the assassination of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani in January 2020, an act that historical precedent would suggest was an act of war.

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US strategy against terrorism has been based practically on assassinations. So killing terrorists abroad before they can hit US soil. While these episodes demonstrate the US government's willingness to take successive and lethal actions in the name of national security, the strike against Suleimani took place while he was abroad.

On the other hand, the operations to topple Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran, Salvador Allende in Chile, and Castro in Cuba depended more on internal elements to facilitate conspiracies. Apart from these episodes, US governments have unquestionably favored the status quo of a predictable adversary.

However, regime change has not always been positive for US interests. Thus, the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was no small factor in the occurrence of the Arab Spring, with effects that continue to reverberate throughout the Middle East today.

This is seen in the civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen, as well as in the ongoing political instability in Egypt and Tunisia. Also, the US invasion of Iraq facilitated the rise of the Islamic State. And the Taliban managed to return to power in Afghanistan despite 20 years of war, thousands of Americans killed and billions of dollars spent, while now harboring insurgent groups that threaten Pakistan, Iran, its Central Asian neighbors and China.

The tendency to accept the known status quo is further strengthened when a country is armed with nuclear weapons. As for Russia, even under the most ideal circumstances in which the US government could eliminate Putin and hide its hand, how confident is Washington that he would be succeeded by a stable and less hostile leadership to the West?

In Russia, as in most autocracies, power rests with those who control the instruments of power. Mainly weapons, but also money, infrastructure, natural resources, connections and knowledge. Currently, that power is concentrated within a small circle of men in their 70s, almost all with very long ties to Putin, dating back to the Cold War-era KGB and St. Petersburg.

The Russian Armed Forces may have numbers in terms of troops and equipment, but under Putin, just as in the Soviet era, they are kept under tight control and closely monitored. The three organizations most capable of operating against Putin and the Kremlin are the Federal Security Service, or FSB; Rosgvardia, or National Guard; and the Presidential Security Service within the Federal Defense Service, FSO.

The FSB is Russia's domestic security and intelligence arm, through which Putin governs given its relatively large and ubiquitous presence in all of the country's institutions. The FSB guarantees Putin's rule, monitors dissidents, intimidates the population, punishes and maintains ties to organized crime.

Rosgvarda is Putin's brute force. It was created in 2016 from among the militias of the interior ministry, and is vigilant against protests, uprisings and armed coup attempts. Alexander Bortnikov heads the FSB, succeeding Nikolai Patrushev.

Until recently, Patrushev served as head of the Security Council and was most likely the Kremlin's No. 2. He may still be, despite being made a presidential adviser on transportation. Bortnikov, like Patrushev, shares Putin's worldview, paranoia about the West, his political philosophy and glorification of the old Soviet empire.

The 300,000-strong Rosgvarda is commanded by Putin's former bodyguard, Viktor Zolotov. With extensive links to organized crime, Zolotov became more famous after the June 2023 revolt of then-Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. Zolotov claimed credit for the defense of Moscow.

He may not be as educated or sophisticated as Putin's traditional associates, but coming from the streets of St. Petersburg, he is not averse to using force to achieve his goals. Apart from his loyalty to his boss, little is publicly known about Zolotov's political approach.

But there is no evidence that he can offer a less hostile alternative to the West. As he did with everyone else in his inner circle to ensure their loyalty, members of the Zolotov family were given lands, gifts and important posts.

If Putin were killed abroad, despite the evidence, the old guard would likely blame the United States, and use it as an argument to consolidate power and rally Russians around them. And sharing Putin's paranoia over the existential threat posed to Russia by the West, there is a risk that they will retaliate militarily, directly and without much restraint.

When discussing the possible assassination of Putin or any other prominent US adversary, the biggest challenge is not necessarily whether it can be done, but whether it should be done. The assassination of Suleimani four years ago presented risks, but at the end of the day, Iran is not an existential threat to the US.

Retaliation could have been more costly if Tehran had chosen escalation, but it would still have been manageable. Russia, on the other hand, as Putin often reminds the West with his threatening speeches about nuclear war, is another matter. What happens if it fails? As Ralph Waldo Emerson once said, "When you set out to kill the king, you'd better not miss!".

Note: Douglas London, professor of intelligence studies at Georgetown University, and fellow at the Middle East Institute. He served for 34 years in the CIA as chief of covert operations.