
The Conference on the Future of Europe is a unique opportunity for European citizens to debate the challenges, the priorities of Europe. It is the place where the main institutions of the European Union dialogue with the citizens and receive recommendations from them on how they want the European Union in the future. The essence of this process is about citizen participation.
The conference, which ended a few days ago, produced a report with 49 recommendations and more than 200 proposals on how to improve the EU. These include deeper EU integration into climate change, social and health policy, and the transition from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the Council, in all policy areas.
EUROPE WITH SOME LEVELS AND SPEED
In the closing speech of the Conference on the Future of Europe in Strasbourg, which coincided with Europe Day, the President of France Emmanuel Macron presented his vision for the establishment of a European Political Community, composed of an external circle of European states, which would be related to the EU, but not necessarily part of it. Macron called on EU member states to create a new Convention as soon as possible to discuss amending the EU Treaties, which would pave the way, among other things, for the creation of this community.
The European Council summit on 23 and 24 June is expected to ignite the first spark in the process, as President Macron, in his capacity as head of state holding the rotating EU presidency, has called for a debate on the creation of the Convention.
Citing the context of the war in Ukraine, he said his vision for a wider circle of European states would provide a way to bring Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries, such as Georgia and Moldova, into the European mainstream. sooner than full EU membership could bring, which could take years or even decades.
As for Ukraine, he said it was already a member of the EU "in our hearts" because of the courageous battle against Russian occupation. But he stressed that everyone knew that full EU membership for Ukraine could take several years or in reality several decades. Precisely because of the EU's strict membership requirements, "the EU can not in the short term remain the only platform to structure the European continent," Macron said.
Such a "political community", according to Macron, would enable "European democracies that believe in our core values a new space for political cooperation on security, energy, transport, infrastructure investment and free movement of people, especially young people ”. Without explicitly mentioning the United Kingdom, for President Macron, the European Political Community may be open to "those countries that have left the European Union".
This vision, for a Europe with different levels or speeds, would extend in the first place within the existing EU members. For example, countries belonging to the Eurozone and the Schengen Area should have the right to discuss and decide policies separately from other EU countries. Other changes to the Treaty that Macron wants include a wider use of qualified majority voting versus veto power, more concrete commitments to the challenges posed by climate change, and more powers for the European Parliament.
If this idea were to be given an institutional form, an EU of "concentric circles" or an EU of "center states" and "peripheral states" would be created. Macron also recalled his previous calls for joint EU action to protect sovereignty and independence. His vision is summed up in "a Europe that chooses partners independently but does not rely on them", a clear reference to NATO and the US.
RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
Macron's idea has met with resistance and has been accompanied by confusion as to what all this means for the continent's future. Even during his first term, Macron's presidency has been marked by innovative ideas for radical reform of the EU and NATO, often giving him the dimension of a strategic thinker rather than a politician. The presentation of these ideas in the intermediate period between the presidential and the expected parliamentary elections, where Macron faces on the one hand the radical anti-capitalist left, and on the other hand with the extreme right, is expected to have an impact on the internal developments of life. politics in France.
Although his bold move is expected to stir up felt waters, it is difficult to assess the degree of coordination with other actors within the EU, as to whether this proposal will manage to become a reality. Macron supports the recommendations of the Conference on the Future of Europe for the extension of qualified majority voting in all EU policy areas. This would expand qualified majority voting in areas such as the common foreign and security policy, taxes, social and budgetary policy.
The way of voting is definitely the "Achilles heel" for the existing EU member states. Member States play a crucial role in this process, as they must agree unanimously on any amendment to the Treaty. However, the time is urgent, because some of these issues, with or without a revision of the Treaty, need to be addressed before the 2024 European Parliament elections.
Only six countries, including Germany, have so far signaled that they are open to launching a Convention. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was cautious in considering it an "interesting idea" that could provide solutions to the challenges the EU will face in the future, unlike Angela Merkel, who opposed any idea of an EU with several levels of speed. Meanwhile, there are thirteen member states, mainly in the east of the EU, but also Sweden and Finland, which oppose the amendment of the Treaties, arguing that the EU works well as it is. From the point of view of Denmark, which is not a member of the euro area, the EU can function satisfactorily. However, the euro area remains essentially dysfunctional.
Enlargement policy or foreign and security policy are also limited by the national veto. The story of the Bulgarian veto on the start of EU membership talks in northern Macedonia, which is paradoxically hampering Albania, or the Hungarian veto on Russian oil sanctions, are just illustrative examples of the EU's inability to act. Therefore, even if the EU were to agree to a process of amending the Treaty, it would embark on a path of deadlock, including national referendums.
It is often joked within the EU itself that if the EU itself were to apply for EU membership, it would not be accepted because it lacks some basic principles that are guiding for democratic societies. Hungary, for example, a country that makes up about 2% of the EU population, exercises a veto over a ban on Russian oil backed by states that speak for about 98% of the population. Likewise, Bulgaria, a country with less than 2% of the EU population, is blocking the start of membership talks with northern Macedonia, which paradoxically holds Albania hostage, a process backed by more than 98% of the talking countries. of the population.
The European Council, by far the most powerful institution of the EU, is not accountable to anyone. His works and those of the Council of Ministers are not public. While the Council is a co-legislative institution in the EU. It is difficult to find another institution with co-legislative powers whose discourses are not public.
Viewed in this context, the proposals of the Conference on the Future of Europe lead to a more democratic EU, aiming at correcting its democratic deficit. This means that the policy areas that Member States have set up at European level need to be regulated through qualified majority voting. A system that takes into account the population of member states, but also protects the interests of smaller states. The qualified majority is at least as democratic as any other voting system. For example, every US state, regardless of size, has two senators. This system is also the product of a compromise that protects smaller states.
Therefore, the main issue related to further EU reform has its origins in decision-making. And related to this is the issue of an EU with several levels and speeds. Not all member states will agree on an extension of qualified majority voting in other areas, let alone in all policy areas. So the EU needs to find a way to compromise on both.
The last time the scope of qualified majority voting was tested in some areas was during the Constitutional Convention in 2002-2003, under the leadership of former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. However, these changes, embodied in the EU Constitutional Treaty, were rejected in the 2004 referendums in France and the Netherlands. The Lisbon Treaty managed to save only a few areas from the application of this way of decision-making.
The treaty also extended the application of another procedure, that of extended cooperation, which has proved dysfunctional in practice. Through the enhanced cooperation procedure, at least nine EU members can move forward among themselves, in specific policy areas. The idea was to give the eurozone a governance platform and create a fiscal union in this way.
That is why the idea put forward by President Macron for a Europe of several levels and speeds should be read in close connection with the issue of qualified majority voting. Therefore, both issues will be addressed together.
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY
President Macron's other idea is to create a European Political Community, at the center of which is a reformed EU and around it states which do not necessarily become members of the EU, but which have a deeper level of cooperation with it. This can serve as a hallmark for full membership for the Eastern Partnership troika, calculating the time and process required until full membership. However, the leaders of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have applied for EU membership, rejecting any alternative to EU membership.
Perhaps, the European Political Community could also serve as a platform for building a lasting relationship for countries such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein or Turkey. Although the above countries have different ambitions and aspirations, they still have a structured relationship with the EU.
The European Political Community proposal is similar to what former French President Francois Mitterrand did shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the time, Mitterrand's idea was rejected, in part because of US opposition that it did not want new "divisions" on the continent. The wars in the former Yugoslavia found Europe unprepared geopolitically. American commitment was crucial to ending the bloody conflicts between Europe. Instead of emphasizing the finalization of the reunification project that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall, as a project in antithesis to bloody wars and conflicts, the EU focused on building euro policy.
Similar ideas have been thrown in the past which have aimed at finalizing the political project of Europe. Thus, in January 2003, former European Commission President Romano Prodi proposed the creation of a "ring of friends" around the EU. This proposal, which aimed at the membership of the Western Balkan states in the EU, in the span of a decade, and at the same time the creation of the "ring of friends" around an enlarged EU, was submitted a year before the great enlargement of 2004 EU, with Central and Eastern European countries.
Some of these proposals were embodied in the Thessaloniki Agenda of 2003, where the EU pledged for the Western Balkan countries to join the EU. Prodi saw the Balkans as a kind of bridge between the east-west expansion strategy and what he called the "new neighborhood policy". Through this policy, a solid relationship would be established with the neighbors of an enlarged EU, in a span that would extend to Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Moldova, and to Morocco, Tunisia and elsewhere.
More or less the same view was recently expressed by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, who proposed the creation of a "European Confederation" as an opportunity to consolidate the European project and transform the EU into a real geopolitical power.
In the current conditions of the war in Ukraine and almost a decade after the last EU enlargement with the accession of Croatia in 2013, the question arises whether the idea proposed by Macron will attract the imagination of Europeans. It is worth noting that Chancellor Scholz dispelled any shadow of doubt over President Macron's proposal on the position of the Western Balkans in this configuration, as he called on the EU to move quickly towards the membership of the Western Balkan states in the EU. Chancellor Scholz announced his visit to the Western Balkans ahead of the EU Summit on 23 and 24 June, as well as the resumption of the Berlin Process as the main mechanism for regional co-operation, thus strengthening Germany's position that there is no alternative to the Western Balkans. EU membership.
Indeed, a European Political Community would require a solid institutional framework and instruments of action. Otherwise it would be just another debating club offering the opportunity for "geopolitical photos". Of course, such a thing requires a change in the Treaty. But above all it is important to have clarity about the true purpose of this idea. Is the European Political Community a consolation prize for countries that will not be able to join the EU, or a step towards full membership?
The answer to this question is essential, especially in the conditions when the EU enlargement process has been in a clinical state for years, where the EU is unable to implement its decisions of 2018 and 2020 for the start of negotiations for membership with Albania and Northern Macedonia, and when it is known that it is President Macron who insists from the beginning of his first term in office that the EU should be reformed rather than enlarged.
Traditionally, France has treated the EU enlargement process with restraint, especially in eastern and southern Europe, as it considers Germany to be the main beneficiary of the enlargement process since 2004, whose economic and trade influence in the east and south of the continent is indisputable.
The need for more clarity of the European project with emphasis on respect for sovereignty and the principle of subsidiarity was revealed by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of France Hubert Védrine in an interview with Le Figaro in 2016, which alarmingly drew the attention of the EU to its normative zeal and self-confidence regarding the enlargement process. Instead of the idea of "relaunching" for the umpteenth time in Europe, Vedrin put forward the need for greater clarification and a new definition of principles and objectives.
It is in the context of the above developments and attitudes that Macron's idea should be read. On the one hand, as a desire to accommodate Ukraine, and on the other hand as an underlining of his unwavering belief that without EU reform and its transformation at some level and speed, there can be no enlargement process for the states either. of the Western Balkans that have been pending since the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit.
Indeed, Macron is the first EU leader to describe what all aspiring EU members understand. The difficult road to EU membership. To be part of the EU, a country must show that it has a strong economy, democratic institutions and that it is not plagued by corruption and that it adheres to the social, political and economic principles of the EU. It is clear that this will not happen to Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia in the short term. Thus, Macron is offering a middle ground by turning Europe into a geopolitical arena.
But for Ukrainians, sanctions are not enough. Helping with weapons to liberate the country could be better than a European Political Community, which as suggested would be nothing but a comforting price in the absence of EU membership. The EU has developed over the years a communication style that often hides more than it reveals. Ukraine may be in the hearts of the EU, but the EU distinguishes between what is in its heart and what needs to be done. Actions are based on rational consideration, which can disappoint the heart. This way of dealing with reality has its origins in the Enlightenment. But will the Ukrainians, who occupied the squares in 2004 and again in 2013 to orient their country on the road to the EU, accept such a proposal?
At the EU Summit held in Versailles on 10-11 March 2022, the Heads of State and Government recognized Ukraine's European aspirations, as they asked the European Commission to prepare an opinion (avis) on Ukraine's application for EU membership, ensuring at the same time that it belongs to the European family. EU member states can grant Ukraine candidate status, and even symbolically start membership talks.
In this way they will express their solidarity with the war in Ukraine and will be politically committed to Ukraine joining the EU once it meets the conditions. However, the precedents of the past do not inspire confidence. Turkey became a candidate country in 1999 and began EU membership talks in 2005, but no one knows whether it will one day become an EU member.
Well, the reality of the EU membership process is more tedious than all the moral claims. The urgency felt by Ukrainians will not be in line with the EU bureaucracy. The political perspective required is more important than the technical requirements. Therefore, the question must be answered what will be the mission of a political and security cooperation on the threshold of Russia, especially when the latter has its military forces in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia. This should be clearly defined, to avoid situations similar to what happened at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, where although the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia's membership in NATO was confirmed, this process did not materialize.
The EU will need to clarify where the enlargement strategy for the Eastern Partnership countries stands in relation to NATO and its open door policy. The North Atlantic Alliance formally adheres to this policy, which is supported by EU countries that are also members of NATO. With the launch of Finland and Sweden's NATO membership process, only Ireland, Austria, Malta and Cyprus remain non-aligned countries within the EU. This means that NATO membership generally precedes EU membership, as is the case, for example, with candidates in the Western Balkans, with the exception of Serbia.
If in the case of Ukraine EU membership continued while NATO membership did not, it would put the EU in a difficult position, as it would accept an extremely geopolitically exposed country, in an uncertain environment. In a hypothetical situation, under Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty, member states have an obligation to provide "assistance by all means at their disposal" to Ukraine as a member state, in the event of an armed aggression on its territory.
Even if the EU and its members were to have their own stronger capabilities, they could not do so without NATO safeguards. Regardless of the accession process, NATO and the EU must closely coordinate policies with the Eastern Partnership countries in the field of security and defense. In the near future, the EU will not be ready to accept the Eastern Partnership countries. To effectively secure its borders with Russia, the EU must significantly expand its military capabilities within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy and deepen cooperation with NATO.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE FOR THE WESTERN BALKANS
The shadows of doubt on the French attitude towards the EU enlargement process with the countries of the Western Balkans have not faded. The countries of the Western Balkans are the clearest evidence of the status quo in the EU membership process. The enlargement process has not found a way to empower the forces of change in society or to draw citizens into the process of democratic consolidation, institutional integrity and the path of reforms for sustainable development.
While the resistance of Ukrainians to the Russian occupation has produced a new reality and expectations in the east of the EU, in the foreground it seems that the focus has shifted from the Western Balkans. The war in Ukraine has important consequences that could affect the long-term status of the Western Balkans. This war will inevitably wake Europeans from their slumber and will make them think and act more geopolitically, which could be beneficial for the progress of the Western Balkan countries' EU membership. Another consequence of the Ukraine war is a change in the perception of Europe 's borders. For most Europeans, the border is now in Ukraine, not the Western Balkans.
Thus, the membership of the Western Balkan states in the EU, about three decades after the end of the war, would be not only long-awaited for the Western Balkans, but also good news for Ukraine. After all, it would show that post-war recovery is possible, and that the EU cares about well-being as well as the status of war-torn countries. Therefore, the EU must end the consequences of the war in the Western Balkans if it is to be credible and effective in addressing the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Let us not forget that the EU itself is born as a peace project. It is time for the EU to show the ability to act and cope with the consequences of war on the continent.
* Analysis published for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Tirana Foundation