"The Vetevendosje Movement is a community of people who refuse to submit...", this is how this political party begins its description of the history of its activities in Kosovo.
Founded in 2005, initially as an independent anti-establishment movement, the Vetëvendosje Movement (LVV) led by Albin Kurti entered the Kosovo Assembly after the 2010 parliamentary elections. Nine years later, it emerged as the first party in the parliamentary elections, securing 29 seats in the Assembly.
LVV leader Kurti co-governed with the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) for 51 days. His government fell in March 2020 after a no-confidence motion by the governing partner.
A year later, the LVV secured 58 seats in the Assembly, after winning over 50 percent of the vote in early parliamentary elections. Kurti governed alone for four years.
"He has built a political narrative of 'us against all'," says Donika Emini, a researcher at the Balkan Policy Advisory Group in Europe (BiEPAG), in an interview with Radio Free Europe (RFE/RL).
But after the February 9, 2025 elections, Kurti, whose party won 48 seats in the Assembly, was left alone in his attempt to form a new government. He rejected the possibility of co-government with the second largest party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). The PDK also took the same position.
Meanwhile, the LDK, as the third party in power in the Assembly, rejected a co-government with Kurti, despite his offer. Kurti was also rejected by the Social Democratic Initiative, which has 3 MPs in the Assembly.
All parties have announced that they are now awaiting the announcement of early parliamentary elections by the President of Kosovo.
How did Kurti end up alone?
During the election campaign earlier this year, Kurti aimed for the result of the 2021 elections, seeking 500,000 votes from citizens.
Naim Rashiti, director of the Balkan Policy Research Group, tells REL that the LVV took the outcome of the 2021 elections for granted.
But, according to him, the electoral system in Kosovo, and the proportional government system, rarely enable such an outcome.
"In a way, the result of the 2021 elections was an accident. It is unlikely that we will have any political entity that will win 50 percent of the elections," Rashiti said.
He adds that the aim of this result once again exposed LVV's polarizing narrative towards other parties, which it had applied throughout its four years of government.
Rashiti recalls that such a narrative was characteristic of the clashes between LDK and PDK in the first decade of this century.
While these two parties have moved towards normalizing the narrative, LVV did the opposite, he says.
"The Vetëvendosje Movement came to power late and came with a belated narrative, which has caused it problems. This narrative has developed internally, but also in relation to foreign policy," Rashiti claims.
Emini is of the same opinion. According to her, LVV has ruled out cooperation with other parties for four years now, "aiming to foster polarization and isolation, instead of building a compromise."
This polarization, according to Emin, aimed to divide into two blocs – the LVV on one side, and other parties on the other.
"He [Kurti] against everyone, where only he is right, and the others are wrong, as harmful alternatives for Kosovo. The creation of two camps makes it easier to align, and he aimed to govern alone and with a free hand," says Emini.
Not infrequently, Kurti, referring to the other two major parties, LDK and PDK, has used derogatory language, calling them “lydykyhi and pydykyhi.” On several occasions, he has called the opposition “hybrids.”
Emini says that Kurti, with such vocabulary, offended not only the opposition parties, but also their electorate.
"On election night [February 9], with the final result still unclear, Kurti called the opposition 'monsters' and 'monsters', fueling polarization and hindering any possible cooperation with Vetëvendosje," Emini emphasizes.
She adds that the former opposition parties were faced with two choices: to join Kurti for co-government, which would cause them to lose dignity and the electorate, or to barricade themselves against cooperation, and for this to be blamed by Kurti.
According to Emini, Kurti understands that this strategy is not politically optimal, but it seems intentional, as a calculation to keep the electorate close for the upcoming elections.
Kurti, after failing to get the votes for a new governing mandate, said that he had twice made an offer to the LDK to govern together, so that it would “break away from the PDK.” He had also made an offer to the Social Democratic Initiative.
"LDK categorically rejects a government led by me. Meanwhile, Nisma, ultimately, did not want to be in a government led by me," Kurti said, warning of two early parliamentary elections, in the winter and in the spring.
PDK and LDK officials emphasized that Kurti was not seeking a coalition partner, but their submission.
The effects of "international isolation"
The polarizing narrative towards former opposition parties is not the only reason why they do not want a co-government with the LVV.
"The Vetevendosje Movement will not be able to find a partner to govern in the future, with a narrative that keeps Kosovo under European Union measures and with a narrative that is attacked by the United States of America or other international factors," Rashiti assesses.
The complicated relations with the US began during the first administration of President Donald Trump, when the "Kurti 1" government was overthrown by a no-confidence motion from the co-government partner, the LDK.
Kurti pretendoi se në rrëzimin e qeverisë së tij pati ndikim asokohe i dërguari i posaçëm i Shtëpisë së Bardhë për dialogun Kosovë-Serbi, Richard Grenell.
“Qeveria ime nuk u përmbys për asgjë tjetër, por thjesht sepse Ambasadori Grenell ishte me nxitim për të nënshkruar një marrëveshje me Serbinë”, pati deklaruar Kurti.
Përgjatë administratës së presidentit Joe Biden, zyrtarët amerikanë kritikuan Kurtin për veprimet e autoriteteve të Kosovës në veri të vendit, i banuar me shumicë serbe.
Vendosja e kryetarëve të rinj shqiptarë në objektet komunale në katër komuna veriore dhe mbyllja e disa institucioneve serbe që Kosova i konsideron ilegale u quajtën veprime “të pakoordinuara” me partnerët perëndimorë, dhe ndër shkaktarët e tensioneve në veri të vendit, të cilat, në disa raste, gjatë vitit 2023, rezultuan me përplasje të grupeve serbe me pjesëtarët e misionit paqeruajtës të Organizatës së Traktatit të Atlantikut Verior (NATO) – KFOR, por edhe me Policinë e Kosovës.
Kritika të ngjashme, Kurtit i erdhën edhe nga BE-ja, e cila, që nga qershori i vitit 2023, ka vendosur masa ndëshkuese ndaj Kosovës.
Së voni, në shtatorin e 2025-tës, SHBA-ja pezulloi Dialogun Strategjik me Kosovën, për shkak të, siç u tha, veprimeve të Qeverisë në detyrë, duke përmendur rritje të tensioneve dhe paqëndrueshmërisë.
Partitë ish-opozitare kanë mbështetur sigurimin e sundimit të rendit dhe ligjit në veri të Kosovës, por kanë kritikuar Kurtin se veprimet në këtë drejtim ishin të pakoordinuara me partnerët e huaj.
Emini konsideron se izolimi i Kurtit, në planin ndërkombëtar, nuk ishte i pritshëm në fillim të qeverisjes së tij, por u thellua me kalimin e kohës.
Sipas saj, situata me masat ndëshkuese të BE-së, si dhe pezullimi i Dialogut me SHBA-në kanë ndikuar në pozitën e Kurtit, jo vetëm ndaj partive politike në Kuvend, por potencialisht edhe ndaj elektoratit.
“Ky ndikim është veçanërisht i dukshëm te votuesit e pavendosur, dhe te ata që nuk janë tradicionalisht të lidhur me ndonjë parti politike, por që vendosin sipas nevojave dhe narrativëve në terren. Si pasojë, masa kritike që e mbështeste Kurtin më parë është dobësuar, duke ndikuar në rezultatet e zgjedhjeve të fundit”, thekson Emini.
Ajo shton se partitë ish-opozitare vazhdojnë të ndjekin partneritet strategjik me SHBA-në, me BE-në ose me partnerë të tjerë bilateralë, dhe se ato “tentojnë të tregohen të kujdesshme në raport me Kurtin në këtë aspekt”.
Megjithatë, Rashiti dhe Emini vlerësojnë se izolimi i Kurtit nga jashtë nuk i atribuohet vetëm veprimeve të tij. Sipas tyre, në këtë situatë përfshihet edhe qasja jo e qëndrueshme e BE-së dhe SHBA-së ndaj Kosovës.
Këto i kanë shërbyer LVV-së në narrativin e vet elektoral, si argumente për mosnënshtrim ndaj kërkesave ndërkombëtare, si dhe i kanë ndihmuar që të sigurojë një mbështetje elektorale.
Por, LVV-ja e Kurtit, pësoi rënie të elektoratit prej 8 për qind brenda katër vjetësh.
A do të ndryshojë LVV-ja?
Despite the decline in the number of LVV voters between the two election cycles, an outcome of a possible snap election in Kosovo is difficult to predict.
The outcome of the eventual election will also determine the fate of the country's next president, who must be decided by a parliamentary majority of 80 votes in two rounds, while in the third round only a simple majority of 61 votes is required.
In April 2026, Vjosa Osmani's term as president of Kosovo ends.
Rashiti estimates that LVV is likely to remain the leading political entity again. However, the election of the country's president requires political consensus, and, consequently, possible coalitions.
In this context, he says that the LVV, but also other parties, during the upcoming electoral campaign should have a more moderate narrative in relation to competitors, but also in relation to domestic and international politics.
Given the practices so far, it remains uncertain whether Kurti and his party will change the narrative.
"I don't know if it will change in the future. But, in the past, we have had political entities that, at first, took the mandate in a hurry, and then gradually matured within the framework of the functioning of the system," says Rashiti.
He adds that political compromise remains necessary to avoid situations where a leader and a party remain alone in the effort to form a government.
Emini does not think that LVV has underestimated the importance of political compromise in Kosovo's parliamentary system.
In fact, she believes that this party has deep experience and knowledge of the political system in Kosovo, having been the most active opposition force for years, carefully reviewing every law and political process.
"They understand that the Kosovo system requires political compromise to function. However, Vetëvendosje has acted deliberately, in a way that feeds the 'us against the others' narrative. Their strategy has been to weaken the opposition as much as possible and, in parallel, to discredit critical voices in civil society and the media, even when the criticism is constructive," Emini emphasizes.
She does not see this as a strategic mistake by LVV, but as a deliberate strategy, through which it aims to marginalize the old political elite, or to include within itself smaller opposition initiatives that are ready for cooperation.
This strategy, she says, provides LVV with symbolic opposition. Such an approach by Kurti's party, she adds, is well-calculated and deliberate, to consolidate power and limit real political compromise.
President Osmani has announced that she will meet with the leaders of political forces to see the eventual possibility of forming a new Kosovo government.
The real possibilities are out of the horizon, and political parties are already preparing to head towards new early elections./ Taken from REL