79 years ago, in November-December 1943, in the area of Cermenika, Shëngjergji and Martanesh, the German invaders organized one of the biggest military operations, "Operation 1828".
In the order of the German command for the preparation of this operation, it is written: " Reports from various sources as well as the attacks carried out last week on the Elbasan-Tirana road prove that in the Martanesh-Shëngjergj region communist gangs have gathered, partially well armed, with a number of up to 2000 men. Most probably in Martanesh there is also the command post of the Communist Executive Headquarters. We think that the main centers of resistance are Shengjergji (barracks of the Italians), Biza e Shengjergji and Guri i Muzhaq. [...] The reports about the construction of barracks and the supply of winter food lead to the conclusion that the communist leaders of Albania consider this area as the main center of direction and resistance and intend to hold it.
The presence of English agent troops (many English officers) as well as the forces distributed by the div can also be considered safe. Italian. Firenze, who have joined gangs.”
As mentioned above, referring to our archival sources, in this area were the newly formed Partisan II Brigade, III Brigade, Dajti battalion, Čermenika battalion and that of Martanesh, with a force of about 1500 fighters. As stated in German sources, the General Headquarters with the National Liberation General Council was located in this area.
The German command aimed to capture and destroy the General Staff (SHP) after destroying the two partisan brigades and the three partisan battalions. By realizing these goals, the Germans envisioned achieving several important strategic objectives, such as annihilating the leadership of the partisan army, extinguishing the anti-fascist movement in Central Albania, securing Tirana from possible attacks, separating the partisan forces in the North from other forces of the partisan army and of course to give courage to the nationalist forces to fulfill their mission alongside the German army.
The strategy of the German command was to annihilate the partisan army, or the communist movement as they called it, through the organization of quick encirclement operations, and after these operational areas were cleared, the National Front with its own forces had to take these areas in defense and not allowed the return of partisan forces". This was also thought of for the 1828 operation.
The decision to carry out this operation was taken by the German command in the first days of November. The General Staff had been able to be informed about this operation that the Germans were planning. He wrote to British General Davis on November 14 that "Our information service informs us that the Germans and elements of the National Front are preparing an attack against the district of Elbasan."
The harsh mountainous terrain of the Čermenike-Shëngjergj-Martanesh area forced the German command to encircle and narrow the operational partisan forces, which spread over an area of about 1000 km², before delivering the final blow.
Initially, the Germans tried to separate the partisan forces from each other by blocking the movement routes and also surrounded the operational area.
The German army and the forces of Fiqiri Dines had closed the side of Dibra. Further, the Germans and the forces of the National Front also controlled the province of Librazhd, (little Čermenika or black Čermenika as it was called). Within the first 10 days of December, the Germans managed to occupy Bërzeshte, Polis, Shpat, Dumre, the provinces near Shkumbin to its south. Meanwhile, the Germans also blocked the Tirana-Elbasan and Elbasan-Përrenjas roads with two battalions. A special German battalion of the well-known "Brandenburg" reconnaissance division was concentrated in Librazhd with the special task of pursuing and destroying the General Staff.
Of course, under these conditions, the General Staff took some measures to get ahead of this operation. First, the destruction and mining of the Tirana-Priskë-Shëngjergj and Labinot-Fushë-Shëngjergj causeways leading deep into this area was ordered. Further, guards and reconnaissance services were organized for the movement of German-ballistic troops. The food reserves and the two available printing presses were also hidden.
Of course, the main measures were taken for the relocation of the General Staff Command from Labinoti to Shmil and the British Staff from Biza to Orenje, as well as for the attack on the German forces participating in the operation.
The German command threw in this operation six infantry battalions, reinforced with five artillery batteries and three engineer companies, with an effective force of about 6500 soldiers. They were also assisted by 1,500 ballistas. The operation began with five attack groups that came from the directions of Dibër, Librazhd, Elbasan, Tirana and Burrel.
The German forces that were learning from Librazhdi met at the stronghold of the Čermenika Battalion, in Zdrajsh. The partisans with fire from their positions and counterattacks nailed the opponent from morning to evening, preventing the German column from getting behind the partisan forces and endangering the General Staff that was going through the forests of Martanesh from Shmil to Orenje. so only 4 km from Zdrajshi. Shenjaze Juka and Bardhyl Popa were also killed in the fighting that day.
However, it should be noted that the partisan forces were not as successful as the battles that took place under the leadership of Librazhdi. The Germans who came from Elbasan had occupied the Labinot-Fushë-Griqan region since the night. They had to drive up the Labinot-Shëngjergj highway. The SHP assigned the protection of this direction to the III brigade. Although a company of this brigade first successfully attacked Griqan early in the morning, when the Germans were still at the base of departure, after an initial confusion and after considerable losses, the Germans recovered and threw themselves into the enemy, after a preparation of strong artillery. The battalions of the III brigade put up a short resistance and left the road, contrary to the order given by the SHP, to protect the Labinot-Shëngjergj road at all costs. According to the order of the SHP, in case the defense would be impossible, the brigade had to withdraw by fighting from the side of Čermenika and Orenja and not in the opposite direction, to the west, from there the brigade left. As a result, the Germans quickly managed to capture Shëngjergji and the Ballistic forces occupied Cermenika. As a result, the partisan forces were fragmented, cooperation was broken and the risk of their tactical encirclement was created. Also, the SHP located in Shmil was seriously threatened.
Then, for the situation created Enver Hoxha would accuse Kadri Hoxha of incompetence and make him guilty for the situation created in the Elbasan area during this operation with the claim that he had not performed his duty well as commander of the Elbasan district headquarters , had not gathered accurate information about the opponent and for passivity, so no offensive initiative.
Likewise, on the night of December 11-12, the three battalions of the II brigade moved in three columns from Guri i Muzhaq (Upper Cermenika) towards the South and Southeast to clear Cermenika e Vogel from the forces of the National Front. This action did not go well, as the information turned out to be wrong. In the villages of Zdrajsh, Përvall, Zgozhd and in Dorëz-Rrapun, where it was not thought that there would be any resistance, the partisans fell under the sudden fire of large Ballistic forces. It didn't take long for the German battalion that was concentrated in Librazhd to intervene to help the ballisticians. The brigade was almost encircled, but it was still able to withdraw by fighting in the region of Shëngjergji. The third battalion suffered the greatest damage, which lost 30-35% of its personnel.
As we pointed out above, Kadri Hoxha was blamed for this situation and then also Hulusi Spahiu. Years later, Beqir Balluku and finally Mehmet Shehu. Actually, that was not right. If we evaluate today in retrospect, we see that the partisan forces found it impossible to cope with these well-organized and well-armed encirclement operations of the German army. The ratio of forces was not favorable, as was the armament and preparation of the partisans.
Despite the resistance of the partisans, the German forces managed to tighten the grip of the siege from all five directions of attack. SHP moved from Shmil to the North in the forests of Kaptina i Martanesh. They no longer had any connection with the II and III brigades, which were the two largest partisan formations in this area.
In this situation, in a march that lasted over twenty days, the SHP to get out of the siege started the movement from Shmili i Čermenika, to Mirakë, Polis, Fushë-Buell and Shushicë of Elbasan, to Shelcan, to Trepenisht, Galigat, Nezhar and Seltë of Shpati, in Stror, Church, Bërsnik and Shënepremte of Vërçë. On March 5, he went to Opar in Korça and on March 9 he reached Panari in Korçë, in the free zone.
The German operation 1828 officially ended on December 23. The troops participating in this operation were ordered to return to their bases. However, the German command left a battalion of about 1,000 soldiers in the Shengjergj-Martanesh region, who were supposed to help the ballisticians settle and organize in these regions.
As for the cooperation of the BK with the Germans, the Commander of the 21st Mountain Corps estimated at the end of the 1828 operation that "Albanian troops still cannot withstand the pressure of the war. The mountain infantry regiments due to their lack of reliability, while the militia battalions due to the lack of personnel.
The Albanian population represented by nationalist gangs participates in the war against the communists. This is best confirmed by the cooperation of local commands with regional nationalist leaders. Nationalist gangs provide reconnaissance and security services, follow us during our attacks, enter regions cleared of communists, and research whether there are still communists or groups of communists in these regions. The condition for their cooperation is the supply of weapons, ammunition and clothing, as well as the provision of assistance by our troops in critical situations.
In Albania, the biggest success is the strong support we have from the nationalist gangs and regardless of material supplies, this is the least expensive way to fight the communists."
At first it seemed as if the German strategy had worked, although they did not achieve the main goal, the complete annihilation of the partisan forces in this region as well as the capture of the General Staff. However, the winter operation, in the framework of which the operation in the Çermenike-Martanesh-Shëngjerg region was also developed, had hit the partisan army hard. The provinces of Central Albania, from the end of February, with the exception of the Peza area, temporarily fell under the control of the invaders. The administration of the government of Tirana was restored, with prefectures and sub-prefectures, gendarmerie posts were established together with the forces of the National Front.
In fact, only the National Front believed that the partisan movement was annihilated. He became even more attached to the invaders. The Germans themselves estimated that during the winter operation, although the partisan movement has received a heavy blow, with the departure of the wild winter and the arrival of spring, the partisan movement would revive again. History showed that this would happen.
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