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Coups in the Kremlin: What history says about Putin's future

2022-10-18 19:59:21Pikëpamje SHKRUAR NGA SERGEJ RADCCENKO
Coups in the Kremlin: What history says about Putin's future
Coups in the Kremlin: What history says about Putin's future

Russian President Vladimir Putin has lost touch with reality. He has announced a partial military mobilization to recover from the losses he has suffered in Ukraine and, clearly showing his desperation, has increased nuclear threats against the West.

Every day that the war continues, his country is becoming more isolated from the rest of the world. Russia is increasingly dependent on China to avoid economic collapse under sanctions, even as Chinese leaders have openly expressed misgivings about the invasion of Ukraine.

Russia's failure to capture Kiev, and the withdrawal of Russian troops in the Kharkiv region of eastern Ukraine in recent days, has even pro-Putin analysts beginning to question his decisions. Against this background, it is logical that many Russians are beginning to question how long Putin can stay in power and continue his barbaric war. A handful of city councilors boldly asked Putin to resign. They expressed publicly what many in the Russian political elite are thinking privately. Apparently, someone in the dark halls of the Kremlin must have decided that Putin must go.

But even if Putin's deputies conclude that their boss must go, removing him from power will be difficult. Moscow has not experienced a single coup attempt, successful or unsuccessful, since the fall of the Soviet Union. There were no serious conspiracies either, at least as far as is publicly known.

Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin's clash with the Supreme Soviet in 1993 – which ended only after Russian tanks fired on the parliament building – is the closest this country has experienced to a coup scenario. And it is more classified as a public clash between an executive and a legislative body.

Yeltsin's Russia, however, was relatively open and democratic, and allowed a degree of dissent. In conditions where Putin is cracking down on any kind of dissent at its source, and is leading Russia towards an increasingly grim authoritarianism, the history of the Soviet Union offers a more apt comparison to the present.

But also better data about what could make a coup successful or fail today in Moscow. This story is also not very encouraging, but somewhat more mixed. Senior Soviet officials successfully organized to overthrow Nikita Khrushchev.

Others took power in rare moments when the country lacked a clear head of state. Usually these officials did not have any ideology or certain political principles, but only strong personal ambitions. Success depended largely on timing and strength: moving quickly and aggressively when the current leader showed weakness.

In Putin's case, there is no shortage of potential usurpers. The people around the president are a bunch of morons. They were chosen by his side for their unquestioning loyalty. But in a highly treacherous environment loyalty is a relative concept. None of them can fully trust Putin.

Neither of them has the luxury of trusting each other. And if they were to start plotting a coup, they would likely want to draw the contrast between themselves and Putin, perhaps citing his failures in Ukraine. Even if they come to power after Putin's death, they can chart a new course that moves Russia away from imperialism.

In the Soviet Union, coups were rare. For example, take the case of Stalin, a brutal dictator who exterminated millions of people for nearly 3 decades, including hundreds of thousands of Communist Party officials. Of the 139 members and candidates for membership of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union elected at the 1934 Party Congress, 98 were later arrested and shot on Stalin's orders.

The vengeful and paranoid autocrat targeted his closest associates, humiliating or pitting them against each other. In retrospect, it seems inconceivable that the Soviet party elite would have tolerated the bloodthirsty tyrant. And yet it happened.

Perhaps in part because of the recognition of Stalin's achievements as a veteran revolutionary and as a war leader. But of course also because of the fear for their lives. His stay in power was dangerous, but planning a coup was something even more dangerous.

Failure would mean the certain death of the conspirators. When Stalin died, a power struggle ensued, which resulted in the elimination of his closest associates. The first victim was the head of Stalin's secret police, at the same time Minister of the Interior Lavrenty Beria, who was greatly feared by his colleagues.

Beria's elimination was so chaotic and so secretive that even today, when most archives are declassified, it is impossible to say exactly what happened. But according to many testimonies, a leading role was played by Khrushchev and Prime Minister Georgy Malenkov.

Initially, the two asked in confidence the other members of the Presidium – the highest political-making body – how they would react to a move against Beria. They then brought several high-ranking military officials into the Kremlin, including Marshal Georgy Zhukov. During a Presidium discussion, Khrushchev talked about Beria's mistakes and abuses, while Malenkov pressed a secret button, after which the military entered and arrested the stunned Beria.

He was later tried by a military court, where he was not allowed to defend himself (perhaps for fear of implicating other senior leaders in the sordid crimes of the Stalin era). He was found guilty and executed. Later, Khrushchev removed Malenkov. No one expected such a result.

After Stalin's death Khrushchev's credentials and political position were far inferior to Malenkov's. But Khrushchev acted decisively, even rudely, which almost caused his downfall. At a meeting in June 1957, several influential members of the Presidium accused Khrushchev of dictatorial tendencies and attempted to impeach him. The votes in the Presidium were seven against and four for him.

He was about to lose his power. But he managed to win the support of Zhukov, then Minister of Defense, and the head of the KGB, Ivan Serov. These two helped him mobilize his supporters in the Central Committee which voted to overthrow the Presidium. A few months later, Khrushchev showed his "gratitude" by dismissing Zhukov from office.

Khrushchev survived for another 7 years, before being overthrown by a coup d'état within the Kremlin in October 1964. At the head of the plot was the man he had supported, Leonid Brezhnev, who took advantage of the growing disillusionment in the ranks of the party and government with the leader.

Brezhnev worked closely with Alexander Shelepin, Khrushchev's one-time close man and former head of the KGB, as well as the current head of the KGB, Vladimir Semichastny.

They took advantage of the absence of the Soviet leader who was vacationing in Abkhazia. He was urgently summoned to Moscow, where his colleagues in the Presidium presented him with a list of grievances and called on him to resign. The hastily convened party plenum confirmed that Khrushchev would retire from leading the country "for health reasons".

The outcomes of power struggles depend on perceptions of success, and most players prefer to ignore them. Sometimes, machinations produce nothing. Despite all the failures and abuses, a leader can last a lifetime and die of natural causes.

There is no doubt that Putin prefers this scenario. He is likely to remain in office. But as his corrupt and brutal rule approaches its 23rd anniversary, and as Putin approaches his 70s, it's almost certain that his potential replacements are eyeing each other carefully and thinking for possible successor assignment scenarios.

Abridged from Foreign Affairs

Note: Sergey Radchenko, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).


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