Napoleon Zervas and his collaboration with the Germans

Naga Prof. ASOC. DR. Marenglen Qasmi

Napoleon Zervas, the "architect" of the ethnic cleansing of the Cham population and organizer of the genocide against the Albanian population in Chameri, would try to justify his criminal actions with the argument that "during the war the Chams had cooperated with the Germans". Even a good portion of Greek historians after World War II have held the same position. This thing isn't true. Any sporadic collaboration with the Germans does not represent all Albanians of Theatrical and as we will see below, Zervas was himself one of the closest collaborators of the Germans.

Zervas' cooperation with the Germans is best documented in the Freiburg Military Archive. This cooperation is also clearly expressed in studies of German military history, such as in the history of the div. I was a German Alpine who worked in Northern Greece and Albania, authored by Herman Frank Mayer, published in 2007, where I was mainly based on the preparation of this article. ["Blutiges Edelweiß. Die 1. Gebirgs-Division im Zweiten Weltkrieg"].

Other than in the Greek archives. It is difficult to find detailed information on Zervas' activity during the war. Herman Frank Meyer rightly writes that, in both the Army's Military History Archives and the Military Archives, there are no traces of Zervas' activity. He even quotes the director of the Archive of Greek Military History at the time, Brigadier General Stavros Dermatas, who claims that Zervas's files had disappeared, which he considered a major scandal. Also, there are few information available in the Archive of the Army General Staff, namely only information about his promotions and departure from the army.

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With the capitulation of fascist Italy, the first armed clashes between Greek formations, mainly EAM/ELAS and EDES, began in Greece. The Germans tried to turn the hostile situation between greek political-military forces back in their favor. Since the main task of the German forces was to organise the defence of the coastline, as in Albania they used the strategy of "divide and rule". As above, div commander. In the German Alpine, General Lanz sent a delegation to Zervas' headquarters, with the aim of reaching an agreement with him. This delegation consisted of Ioannina mayor Vlachlidis, businessman Doumas, church deacon Nasi and Red Cross employees, Swiss Caravas and Bickel.

Zervas was best suited to cooperate with them, as his anti-communist stance was known. As in other countries, the communist movement was considered the greatest opponent of the Germans and who did not compromise with them.

The so-called "Delegation of Ioannina" arrived at Zervas' commander's place, in Skiadades in Golden on the afternoon of 4 October 1943. At 6 p.m. the delegation was received by Zervas and his deputy, Pyromaglou. Zervas quietly listened to the delegation's requests and promised to return a response in two days. During the dinner, Zervas retorted to the delegation that he would return an answer after contacting the allies in Cairo and consulting on the offer he had received. He was obliged to take this step, as talks were also attended by the Attached British Liaison Officer at his headquarters, Rodokanakis, of Greek origin.

Zervas informed the delegation that it had decided to implement a 14-day non-stop-attack pact with General Lanz. In a private conversation with Bickel, Zervas said he was willing to sign an armistice with the Germans if three conditions were met. The first, for the Germans to announce it a few days before they withdrew from Greece. The second, all heavy weapons and combat materials that could not be transported, had to be handed over to his troops, and third, he was willing to meet with General Lanz and discuss further details of the ceasefire. In fact, as we will see below, Zervas has repeatedly avoided his personal encounters with the Germans.

Apparently, Zervas had contacted the allied headquarters in Cairo and informed him of his decision. Apparently through this action he blackmailed Cairo into interrupting aid to EAM/ELAS and supplying only his forces.

A few days later, on 9 October, German General Ludwiger sent a second delegation from Arta to meet with both EAM/ELAS and EDES, with the aim of reaching an agreement. The delegation consisted of metropolitan Golden, Spiridon and county doctor Christos Komborosos. The EAM/ELAS command categorically refused to meet with them, while Zervas received the delegation and confirmed to them that it had established a non-attack pact against the Germans until 14 October 1943.

The ceasefire offer was welcomed by the Germans. In order to extend the ceasefire, on October 8, General Lanz met again with the Swiss red cross representative, Bickel. Meanwhile, Bickel had met on the morning of that day with Zervas' liaison, Joanis, who had announced that Zervas was ready to meet with General Lanz's representatives. Meanwhile, Lanz got in touch with his superiors, who approved the meeting with Zervas, if three conditions were respected: Zervas' troops had to hand over weapons, German captives and all their liaison technique.

It was clear to Lanz that under these conditions no agreement could be reached with Zervas. He therefore suggested to his command that Operation Panther, which was about to begin in Epirus, be delayed after talks with Zervas. His request was approved, but the operation would still begin no later than October 18.

The meeting with Zervas was set for October 16. Bickel accompanied by several German officers arrived at the appointed spot on time. But joannis, Zervas's liaison, appeared, who announced that Zervas was unable to come to the meeting, but had sent a representative, Captain Costa Galanis, who had studied in Switzerland. With perfect German, Galanis tried to justify Zervas' absence at the meeting.

The meeting did not fail. It was agreed that Joannis should appear the next day to General Lanz, who would give him a letter for Zervas. From this day until July 1944 between the German staff and the Zervas headquarters began a dense exchange of information and concrete measures were taken towards their common enemies, EAM/ELAS. On October 18, Operation Panther began. During it, the Germans attacked only communist forces and there was no armed clash with Zervas' forces.

After the agreement, the number of attacks on German forces in Northern Greece dropped significantly. Meanwhile, a busy situation was reported in Southern Albania, with attacks and fierce fighting between German and partisan forces.

General Lanz aimed to expand cooperation with Greek nationalist forces. His goal was to eliminate hostility with the nationalist forces of Zervas and together to fight against communist forces. On the other hand, this cooperation gave the Germans the opportunity to focus on protecting the coastline with the few forces they had. Also, the successful cooperation german forces had with Zervas forces during the operations "Panther" and "Tiger", gave hope to the German general that Zervas could take transport routes under guard. With these goals in mind, Lanz was willing to supply the EDES forces with weapons and ammunition and treat them as allied forces.

Furthermore, on the evening of 18 December 1943, captain Kosta Galanis, who had been sent from Zervas, was again sent to the command of the German mountain infantry. Referring to the protocol notes of the chief of the German division' intelligence, at the end of the talks it was agreed that the parties were primarily ready to cooperate with each other, especially for a joint war against communist forces and that Zervas was willing to meet with the German side at a time that the German command considered reasonable. The Germans had to secure their route.

On 23 December, Galanis set out to meet Zervas and inform him of the talks. On 30 December he returned to the German division and on behalf of Zervas guaranteed that if the Germans did not commit any acts against EDES, then Zervas would not attack and acts of sabotage would not be committed against the German army. He would also try to prevent the British from taking similar actions. Galanis further asked the Germans for their understanding that Zervas had not formulated these positions in writing. The reason was understandable. He could not risk such a letter falling into the hands of the Communists or the English. Zervas felt in some way indebted to the English because they had supplied him with weapons, clothing and ammunition. However, these few supplies they had given for their own interest, to fight the Germans. He further explained to the Germans that the English had promised him dozens of times that they would send loads of supplies, but they never came. He was then told that he was lying. So he was unable to fight against his opponents, the Communists, who were gaining more and more ground. For this reason, he was ready to meet for representatives of the German command, with the aim of coordinating joint fighting against communist forces.

General Lanz, who was a furious anticommunist, said he understood Zervas' position. Consequently, in the attack that Zervas forces organized in early 1944 against EAM/ELAS forces, Lanz ordered German troops to guard the backs of EDES forces. So Zervas managed to throw communist forces across the Achelos River and gain a lot of ground. After this success, Zervas took another step. According to German reports dated January 9, Zervas had requested the organization of a meeting on January 19, with the aim of coordinating the joint struggle against the communists. The commander of the German Army Winter authorized the meeting. But he warned that if Zervas did not show up at the meeting, there would be no more such. The meeting was not held, but not because of Zervas. General Lanz left six weeks on vacation and his chief of staff Dietl, who could conduct the negotiations, left the front as well, after being seriously ill from diabetes.

Gjithsesi, pak ditë më vonë u organizua një takim ndërmjet një të besuari të Zervas-it me një oficer të div. 104 gjerman. Ai u tha gjermanëve se gjenerali Zervas mendonte se lufta civile në Greqi e kishte marrë tashmë udhën e saj drejt zgjidhjes. Gjithsesi bashkëpunimi me gjermanët ishte përsëri i dëshiruar. Mesa duket, disa fitore që Zervas-i pati ndaj forcave komuniste ia përforcuan atij bindjen se mund t’ia dilte vetë edhe pa ndihmën e gjermanëve. Euforia e Zervas-it nuk zgjati shumë. Dy javë më vonë, EAM/ELAS-i e rifitoi përsëri terrenin e humbur. Trupat e Zervas-it nuk kishin më municion dhe më 27 janar ishin përsëri në pozicionin e tyre fillestar të sulmit, pranë lumit Arachthos.

Kështu që Zervas-i ju drejtua përsëri për ndihmë gjermanëve, i trembur se mund të gjendje mes dy zjarresh. Më 31 janar 1944 ai dërgoi te gjermanët ish-kapitenin e Shtabit të Përgjithshëm dhe nomarkun e Trikallasë, Theodoros Sarandis, i cili u identifikua me një prokurë të nënshkruar personalisht nga Zervas-i dhe me vulën e Shtabit të Përgjithshëm të EDES-it. Bisedimet filluan pasi u verifikua origjinaliteti i dokumentit. Oficeri i zbulimit të korparmatës gjermane i ka protokolluar si më poshtë propozimet e Zervas-it: Së pari, nuk duhej të ushtrohej asnjë akt armiqësie ndaj tyre. Së dyti, organizimi i luftës së përbashkët ndaj EAM/ELAS-it duhej të bëhej nëpërmjet oficerëve ndërlidhës të dy palëve, duke u informuar për qëllimet, vendndodhjen e tyre dhe të armikut. Nëse këto dy propozime pranoheshin nga komanda gjermane, atëherë më 3 shkurt Zervas-i me forcat e tij do të sulmonte forcat komuniste nga bregu perëndimor i lumit Arachthos në rajonin Agnanda-Pramanda dhe kërkonte mbështetjen e forcave gjermane nga rruga e Metsovos drejt Pramandas, në Jug.

Since the Germans were interested in clearing this area by EAM/ELAS forces, they immediately approved the organization of this joint action, which they coded as "Sperber" (Hawking shorts – small bird of prey]. The German command made available to this operation a reinforced battalion and two military groups. The joint operation began on February 3 at four a.m. Of the 2500 forces Zervas had at this time, he engaged in this operation about 1800 forces, while 700 men left them on the mountain as reserves.

In order to disguise his agreement with the Germans, on 2 February Zervas had informed Cairo by radio that the Germans would conduct an attack in the Kalentsi-Gotista-Metsovo region. The Allies had to intervene for EAM/ELAS partisans to leave the Tzoumerka region [Athamanika] in order for Zervas to go to this area and fight against the Germans.

As the Germans had predicted, EAM/ELAS forces withdrew without a fight. First greek partisans clashed with the Germans in Pramanda on the morning of February 5. Meanwhile, the British officer near Zervas informed Cairo that Zervas had moved further south to regroup his forces.

Zervas used a typical trick for him. During the preparation of the operation plan, it was agreed that the Germans would act as if they were attacking Zervas' headquarters. And so it happened. As a result, Cairo was informed "of the heroic two-front war of Zervas", which would be reported to Churchill in London. As a result of this fake news, Churchill, angry at the peak, loudly cursed the shamelessness and betrayal of EAM/ELAS forces, promising to stop supplying them with aid. As you can see, the scam worked.

According to German officer Erdmann, who coordinated the actions with EDES, the operation was successfully carried out as every detail was carefully planned between the two sides. On the ground, it also worked best to maintain contact with Greek nationalist forces. Coordinated actions and objectives. The Germans also supplied Zervas forces with Italian weapons and ammunition.

This joint operation proved successful for Zervas and the Germans. Until October 1944, EAM/ELAS forces could not cross the Arachthos River again. Zervas sent Sarandis again to thank the German command for the assistance provided and to assure them of his loyalty. As a reward, the Germans did not harass the caravans with supplies for Zervas. After General Lanz returned from vacation, he ordered Zervas to supply a large amount of medicine and medical aid, which sarandis took over.

After Operation Sperber, Zervas sent valuable information to the Germans almost daily. Thus, for example, in a protocol of the conversation dated 9 February 1944 Sarandis informed the Germans that Zervas was successfully continuing fighting against EAM/ELAS forces, although the British sought to cease the war against them. Zervas had told the British that he would only cease the war when communist forces released all of Epirus to him. Zervas also guaranteed the Germans that no hostile act would take place on his territory. If the Allies landed on his territory, Zervas would not fight against the Germans, but would not fight against the Allies.

The "Gentlemen's Agreement" or "silent agreement" with Zervas, as the Germans called it, was kept secret with fanaticism from both sides. In German protocols Zervas was marked with the pseudonym "Zacharias" and his mediator (probably Sarandis), nicknamed "Miku".

Despite the secret, the word of the agreement came out. Strangely, even the British mission did not believe this and said that no written agreement had been found and all this was propaganda organized by the Communists against Zervas. So, the British liaison officer near Zervas, Barnes, asked Cairo to send more weapons to Zervas' forces, so that EAM/ELAS would no longer dare to attack EDES. The other British officer Woodhouse was of that opinion. Unlike his two colleagues, British officer Barker-Benfield did not trust Zervas and was convinced that he had made deals with the Germans.

It is worth noting that Operation Sperber saved Zervas and reduced the impact of EAM/ELAS forces on Epirus. By providing valuable military information to the Germans, Zervas managed to deceive both the Allies in Cairo and EAM/ELAS. This operation, carried out together with the Germans, managed to secure German roads and until July 1944 there were no major attacks on German forces. However, EAM/ELAS partisans managed to organize about 140 acts of sabotage in this period and destroyed more than 40 German trains and locomotives. In this period, about 4,300 German soldiers were killed.

Despite the reality, the British did not release Zervas. EDES received about three times as much british aid armaments and ammunition as EAM/ELAS, although the latter had at least seven times as many fighters as EDES. In July 1944, after it was clear that the end of the Germans in Greece was approaching, Zervas broke the agreement and ordered his troops to commit acts of sabotage against German forces. He had benefited from them enough and could no longer risk his cooperation with the Germans being revealed by the Greek people and the British, which he could best conceal.